


## Chapter 10

### INCHON 1950



When North Korean troops invaded the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment, stationed at Camp Crawford, Japan, had only two battalions due to a general manpower shortage that effected nearly all regiments in Japan.<sup>1</sup> Because the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment's parent, was stationed closest to the Soviet Union, it was to continue occupying and protecting Japan while the other three divisions deployed to Korea. In keeping with that plan, its three infantry regiments, the 17<sup>th</sup>, 31<sup>st</sup>, and 32<sup>nd</sup>, were stripped to help fill the three divisions that deployed to Korea in July. Replacements from the US arrived slowly because the Army only had ten active divisions, all understrength.<sup>2</sup>

In Korea, the situation quickly grew desperate. Better-trained, better-armed, and better-motivated North Koreans inflicted heavy losses on the first American units to arrive from Japan<sup>3</sup>. World War II-era 2.36 inch antitank rockets bounced harmlessly off of Soviet-supplied T-34 tanks and there were too few troops to keep the North Koreans from streaming around the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, the first to arrive, precipitating a series of panicky retreats southward. The 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry and 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Divisions fared little better, barely clinging to the southeastern corner of Korea by the end of July.

In Japan, the depleted 7<sup>th</sup> Division soon began receiving replacements, a combination of green recruits from the US and more seasoned men drawn from troop units all over the United States. The 12<sup>th</sup> Armored Infantry Battalion from Ft Hood, Texas, for example, deployed almost en masse in mid-July. From Fairfield-Suisun Airfield (later Travis Air Force Base) near San Francisco, but its troops deployed in platoon-size packets to Japan. On arrival, they were sent as individual replacements to different regiments and dispersed further among needy companies, losing the cohesion and tactical proficiency they had cultivated for a year or more at Fort Hood. In the US, battalions of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Armored, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry, and 11<sup>th</sup> Airborne Divisions were drawn down to skeletons and some were completely zeroed out.<sup>4</sup>

In August 1950, 340 replacements were arriving in Japan and Korea by air each day, not enough to replace the losses early deploying units had suffered. By August 5, 7858 men had been killed or seriously wounded and only 7711 replacements had arrived in the Far East. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division from Fort Lewis, Washington, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Brigade from Camp Pendleton, California, the 5<sup>th</sup> Regimental Combat Team from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and the partially-formed 29<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment from Okinawa were sent to plug gaps in the steadily shrinking perimeter protecting Korea's southernmost port, Pusan. Although the 7<sup>th</sup> Division was closer to Korea than any of those units, it was not as combat-ready.

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<sup>1</sup> Of the 13 infantry regiments stationed in Japan and Okinawa (then a separate US dependency) in 1950 only the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment had its full complement of 3 battalions. The 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry was missing its 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion.

<sup>2</sup> They were the 1<sup>st</sup> Inf Div in Germany, 2<sup>nd</sup> Inf Div at Ft Lewis, 3<sup>rd</sup> Inf Div at Ft Benning and Ft Devens, 7<sup>th</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup>, and 25<sup>th</sup> Inf Divs and 1<sup>st</sup> Cav Div in Japan, 11<sup>th</sup> Abn Div at Ft Campbell, 82<sup>nd</sup> Abn Div at Ft Bragg, and 2<sup>nd</sup> Arm Div at Ft Hood. There were also six training divisions (4<sup>th</sup> Inf Div at Ft Ord, 5<sup>th</sup> Inf Div at Ft Jackson, 9<sup>th</sup> Inf Div at Ft Dix, 10<sup>th</sup> Inf Div at Ft Riley, 3<sup>rd</sup> Arm Div at Ft Knox, and 5<sup>th</sup> Arm Div at Ft Chaffee). These had a cadre and trainees, but were not organized or equipped to fight.

<sup>3</sup> The 24<sup>th</sup> Division's commanding general, Major General William F. Dean, was captured when the North Koreans took Taejon.

<sup>4</sup> When the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division deployed to Korea in November 1950, one of its regiments had been zeroed out at Fort Benning, requiring it to "borrow" a regiment from the Antilles Command in Puerto Rico, brought to full strength with a battalion from the Panama Canal's defense force.

After being scattered all over Japan to secure the vacated garrisons of divisions that had deployed to Korea, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division was assembled for pre-deployment training at Camp Fuji, a dusty firing range near the town of Gotemba in the shadow of Japan's famed Mount Fuji. The division had only 574 officers and 8200 enlisted men, barely half of its authorized strength. Before deploying to combat, it would have to form units missing from its authorized structure. To help fill the void, 8307 Koreans were gathered off the streets of South Korean towns, packed aboard ships, and shipped to Japan to join the 7<sup>th</sup> Division. They were called Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA). Of the total, the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry received 1857 Koreans, roughly half the regiment's strength. While the numbers must have looked good to planners in Tokyo and Washington, the practical impact was more negative than positive. Most KATUSAs spoke no English, making cooperation difficult at best. They received almost no military training, firing only five rounds from their newly issued Springfield M-1 rifles in Japan, and they had great difficulty adjusting to American food and field sanitation standards. GIs in rifle squads were paired with KATUSA counterparts while heavy weapons elements made their KATUSAs ammunition bearers. Seeing a disaster in the making, Colonel Richard P. Ovenshine, the regimental commander, planned a full program of training for his polyglot outfit, but he would not get the time.

On September 3, Typhoon *Kezia* roared across southern Japan with winds up to 110 miles an hour, wrecking the port city of Kobe where the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was staging. The typhoon also wrought havoc at Camp Fuji, scattering squad tents all over the landscape. Warned of the storm's approach, most men fled to the more substantial private dwellings and public buildings of Gotemba and other nearby villages. In most cases, they were graciously welcomed by Japanese families, but the mix of muddy GI boots and tatami rice mat floors was most unwelcome. In Japan, people take off their footwear before entering a residence. Accompanying heavy rains turned Camp Fuji into a sea of mud, putting an end to the idea of serious training. Three days later, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division received orders to move by road and train to the port of Yokohama. The last serial reached the port on September 7 and was quickly herded onto a waiting ship. Hundreds of the regiment's newest replacements had not even been assigned to companies yet.



Typical of the latest arrivals was 19 year-old Private Don Monterosso. Don enlisted in March 1950 and took basic training at Camp Roberts, California—away from Michigan for the first time in his life and desperately homesick. Basic and advanced individual training was 16 weeks of dismounted drill, physical conditioning, military courtesy, and “don't worry about all that combat stuff, you'll get that in your permanent unit”. What later saved Don's life, though, was the 70 hours he spent firing a Garand M-1 rifle at targets ranging out to 550 yards. When the Korean War began, Don was enroute to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, but he didn't get to stay very long. In early September, he left McChord Field, near Tacoma, Washington on a Dakota C-47 transport to Haneda Air Base near Tokyo, stopping in Alaska enroute. At the Far East Command's Transfer Point at Camp Zama, he was assigned to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division. The next day he was given a set of the division's “hourglass” shoulder patches and herded onto a train to Yokohama. There, he was promptly hustled aboard the attack transport *Simon B. Buckner* with

hundreds of similarly bewildered newcomers.

Despite the rush, the division's troopships would stay at anchor in the harbor for another three days while tanks, trucks, howitzers, communication vans, and heavy engineer equipment were loaded onto cargo ships and Navy LSTs. The 7<sup>th</sup> Division's ships departed Yokohama on the morning of September 10, joining the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division and other units of the hastily formed X Corps at a rendezvous point off the Japanese island of Kyushu. The convoy included 261 ships from seven countries. Many of the cargo ships' crewmen were former members of the Imperial Japanese Navy who had been fighting Americans just five years earlier. At sea, men became violently ill, overworking sanitation facilities and turning overcrowded troop compartments into slimy, stinking hell holes. Don Monterosso curled up under his poncho in a gun bucket<sup>5</sup> on the deck, preferring the rain and salt spray to the stench below.

## **INCHON**

Unit commanders opened Top Secret orders once the ships were underway, informing them that Inchon was their destination. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division would go ashore on September 15. The 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division would follow, landing just south of the port. On September 15, Don Monterosso was assigned to A Company, but he didn't know anyone in the unit and couldn't understand his KATUSA partner. After a rough journey in the typhoon's wake, ships dropped anchor ten miles from Inchon at on September 16. Outside the harbor, the battleship USS Missouri, five cruisers, and six destroyers were pounding enemy positions deeper inland.

The day before, the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment took Wolmi-do, an island dominating Inchon's narrow shipping channel. Ships could not enter the tidal harbor without getting stuck and there were no landing craft to take the 7<sup>th</sup> Division ashore since they were still in use by the Marines. Tides at Inchon can fall as much as 32 feet in 12 hours, leaving only mud flats in their wake. The only time troops could land was a two-hour period before high tide and a similar period after high tide. On September 18, the 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry became the first of the 7th Division's regiments to go ashore, establishing blocking positions astride Seoul's southern approaches. Finally, on September 19, landing craft came alongside the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry's transports and began taking troops ashore.

The next morning, the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry, less its 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, established hasty defensive positions south of Seoul. Its mission was to stop North Koreans from getting into Seoul from the south. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion remained in reserve near Inchon. As any unit tends to be when it first enters combat, the 31<sup>st</sup> was jittery. Many men went ashore not knowing a single person in their unit. Mixing green, jittery troops with lethal weapons often leads to fatal accidents. Private Paul H. Nielson of K Company became one of the regiment's first fatalities in Korea when he failed to heed a sentry's warning and was shot by one of his comrades. On the morning of September 21, the 7<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Company and 73<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion led the advance to Suwon Airfield, with two battalions of the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry close behind them. After several minor skirmishes along the route, the force reached the airfield late that afternoon.

## **ON TO OSAN**

With its 8000 foot concrete runway, Suwon airfield was a critical prize, necessary for both aerial resupply and fighter operations, but there were still enemy troops in the area and more were arriving. Intelligence reported that enemy forces, including tanks, were gathering on high ground south of Suwon.

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
<sup>5</sup> Attack transports, all built during World War II, mounted a variety of anti-aircraft weapons, ranging from .50 calibers to 40mm automatic guns. All were mounted in large circular steel "tubs" protecting their crews from shrapnel and smaller ordnance.

Just after dark on September 21 and again after midnight on September 22, two platoons of North Korean tanks attempted to storm the airfield. They lost four tanks of their own and destroyed one American tank. On the morning of September 23, the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion entered the city of Suwon. In and around the town, the task force captured 240 North Koreans, most of whom discarded their weapons and surrendered without a fight. All looked tired and hungry, having marched for days to escape the Eighth Army's counteroffensive.

Advancing on a parallel axis on the opposite side of the Suwon-Osan highway was the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion. Near the village of Pyongjam-ni, the battalion's lead unit, Captain Charles Howard's G Company, encountered heavy small arms, machinegun, mortar, and tank fire. While G Company took whatever cover could be found, the rest of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, reinforced by A Company, conducted a wide envelopment around the town to take a hill blocking the way to Osan.

Sergeant Charles A. Lonsford, then a platoon sergeant (2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon A Company), recalls that his company's objective was a ridge 2 kilometers south of the line of departure. Against light resistance, his company quickly gained its objective and aggressively pursued fleeing North Koreans, soon outdistancing the rest of the regiment. After being ordered twice to stop, the company halted on its objective and waited for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion to catch up. An aerial observer reported four enemy tanks astride the battalion's path. During the extended halt, Lonsford dozed off and awoke amid a tank battle. Two North Korean T-34 tanks were knocked out by the 73<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion less than 200 yards from where he slept.

PFC Glenn Justice, a 57mm Recoilless Rifle gunner in G Company, was moving across a wide, foul smelling rice paddy when the shooting began. As the outgoing fire intensified, his head started aching, his ears became stopped up, his throat went dry, and his heart was pounding. He was in combat for the first time, experiencing an unsettling mixture of fear and exhilaration. North Korean mortar fire "walked" along the adjacent road where tanks were stopping to fire on North Korean positions. Lieutenant William G. Fuss and Master Sergeant Kenneth J. Whalen of G Company's 4<sup>th</sup> Platoon had just climbed aboard one of the tanks to get a better view of the enemy positions when a mortar round struck the turret, killing both men instantly. In all, five men in G Company were killed and seven were wounded



as small arms and mortar fire hammered the area.

Although it seemed like an eternity to men trying to find protection where there was none, American artillery eventually suppressed the mortars and pounded the hillside blocking G Company's advance. As artillery fire shifted to the hill's backside, G Company began moving up the forward slope, firing as they went. Frightened North Koreans soon began abandoning their foxholes to flee over the top but few made it. When a North Korean fell to the bark of his carbine, Glenn Justice felt sick, realizing he had just shot a human being. Nearby, KATUSAs were blatantly firing into the air. Few would shoot fellow Koreans because friends and relatives had been forcibly conscripted by the North Koreans as they rolled across South Korea. When the fighting ended, 67 enemy soldiers lay dead in front of the ridge, 38 more were killed on the back side, and 7 frightened POWs squatted amid the carnage.

Late that afternoon, one of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion's patrols encountered a force equipped with at least two heavy machineguns and a mortar. They seemed determined to break through to the north. Late into the night, firefights erupted throughout the area as patrols from both sides probed each other's positions. Enemy mortar fire hit inside the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion's perimeter after dark and a brief tank attack was repulsed by the 73<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion. As illumination flares died out, the area remained lit by the flaming hulks of five enemy tanks.

On September 25, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, with A Company, 73<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion attached, continued its advance toward Osan while the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion sent patrols onto high ground south and east of Suwon. One patrol sighted three truckloads of enemy troops that had by-passed the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion. Late that morning, the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery's aerial observer spotted approximately 500 enemy troops and two tanks just 1000 yards from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion's CP. As the fighting intensified, Colonel Ovenshine approved a request to pull the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion back due to the heavy volume of fire it was taking. The 57<sup>th</sup> and 92<sup>nd</sup> Field Artillery Battalions blasted the area, dispersing the enemy force. Nearly 100 enemy soldiers surrendered before dark. The prisoners revealed they were members of the 105<sup>th</sup> Tank Brigade, totaling around 3000 troops.



Around noon, the Regimental Tank Company and a supply column arrived from Inchon. As if to greet them, the North Koreans fired four 75mm recoilless rifle rounds into the Suwon Airfield perimeter. The rounds landed near the regimental CP, but caused no casualties. PFC Boyce McCreary, a 19 year-old supply truck driver in the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry's Headquarters Company recalls that his truck, laden with ammunition, was shot up in an ambush enroute to the airfield. Seven of his eight tires were punctured and there were bullet holes all over the truck's cab and cargo bed but he was not hit and the ammunition did not ignite. God smiled on him that day and every day thereafter was a precious gift.



PFCs James R. Brawner and Irwin Katter of the regiment's Heavy Mortar Company were manning an outpost on the airfield perimeter when their platoon sergeant told them to check the adjacent village to make sure no civilians remained there. An airstrike was scheduled to hit the village and he wanted to avoid killing civilians. The pair had just reached the edge of the village when a pair of US Air Force F-80 "Shooting Stars" dove to attack, firing just over their heads. As the planes made repeated strafing passes, Brawner and Katter crawled along a ditch all the way back to the perimeter. They did not want to be seen by a fast-flying fighter pilot who might mistake them for North Koreans.

Three tanks from the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division's 70<sup>th</sup> Tank Battalion carrying a platoon from L Company of the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment met the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry's 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion near Osan on the morning of September 26. There was no radio communication between the 31<sup>st</sup>'s rifle companies and the approaching cavalymen, so the meeting was a surprise to those at the tip of both spears. Until then, only North Korean tanks had approached from the south. The linkup could have ended in tragedy as tankers, antitank gunners, and artillerymen all zeroed in on the approaching column. A lone 57mm recoilless rifle round struck the lead tank, but did not explode. Fortunately, the tankers knew they were nearing "friendly" lines and did not respond. Someone with experience at Fort Hood recognized the tanks as American and passed the word not to shoot. Just in the nick of time! The meeting linked the Pusan perimeter's defenders with the Inchon invasion force.

Near daybreak on September 27, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion attacked Hill 113 against stiff resistance on the southern and eastern slopes. The North Koreans were expertly camouflaged and made extensive use of snipers to impede the advance. Rudy Reyes of F Company's 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon, recalls that his platoon leader, Lieutenant Don C. Engh of Del Norte, California led his platoon's wild charge over the top of the ridge. Engh was killed by a grenade or mortar round just as he reached the other side. By nightfall, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion controlled the hill's southwest face, but the enemy still held the reverse slope. Companies K and L relieved Companies E and F during the night.

At noon the next day, an air strike and heavy mortar and artillery concentrations hammered enemy positions in preparation for the final assault by A, G, K, and L Companies of the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry and A Company, 73<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion. Enemy resistance had already melted away, however, leaving 14 destroyed tanks, 6 antitank guns, several mortars, large numbers of small arms, and nearly 300 enemy dead littering the battlefield. The week's toll for the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry and attached units was 25 dead and 75 wounded. Typical of the division's recent fillers, Don Monterosso was away from the US for the first time in his life, traveled by plane for the first time, went to sea for the first time, and was shot at for the first time—and he was barely 19.



On October 1, the 31<sup>st</sup> mopped up isolated resistance between Suwon and Osan and conducted motorized patrols along the 40-mile corridor between the towns to keep the road open. At noon, the 1st Cavalry Division assumed responsibility for Osan, extending its area of influence to the east and west against scattered light resistance. Truck convoys carrying jubilant units of the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> ROK<sup>6</sup> Infantry Divisions streamed through on their way to Seoul. On October 2, the US 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment assumed responsibility for the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry's sector. With enemy resistance nearly ended, Colonel Ovenshine initiated the training program he had been unable to conduct in Japan. Naval aviation and the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery Battalion supported a series of battalion live fire assault exercises. A particular objective of the training was fostering mutual confidence, cohesion, and teamwork among the regiment's American and Korean members.

On the morning of October 4, an L-19 Piper Cub named the "Blue Goose" landed at Suwon. Painted on its fuselage was X Corps' blue and white shoulder patch. Major General Ned Almond, X Corps' commander, had come to watch the regiment's training. In a foul mood, he was quick to find fault with the way the training was being conducted. Almond felt Colonel Ovenshine was too old to command in combat and was displeased by what he considered sluggish performance during the attack to take Osan. The next day, the 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment's Heavy Mortar Company fired on one of its own battalions during a similar training exercise, killing 5 men and wounding 55 others. All aircraft available to X Corps were diverted to evacuate casualties and bring in doctors and plasma. Someone's head would roll, but not the one most people expected.<sup>7</sup> In a move few understood, Almond sacked Colonel Ovenshine, replacing him with Colonel Allan D. MacLean, formerly G-3 of the Eighth Army.

<sup>6</sup> ROK is the acronym for Republic of Korea.

<sup>7</sup> Colonel Herbert B. Powell, commanding the 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment when the mortar incident occurred, would become one of the Korean War's most successful regimental commanders. His was the only regiment in any American division to reach the Yalu River, Korea's border with China, but he brought it out of North Korea with

## BACK TO SEA

Before dawn on October 5, the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry's motor column departed Suwon for the port of Pusan, a journey of over 350 miles—36 hours if all went well. Unfortunately, there were not enough trucks in the whole corps to move the entire 7<sup>th</sup> Division, so drivers would have to make multiple trips. Radio contact was lost shortly after the column got underway and because of the 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry's mortar incident, no aircraft were available to monitor the convoy's progress and report the locations of disabled vehicles. Traversing battle damaged roads through areas where North Korean troops still lurked, drivers were cautioned not to stop for any reason. There would be no way to call for help if they got ambushed. By 8 AM, the convoy extended 55 miles from lead to trail. With most radios not working, convoy discipline broke down from the start. Some convoy segments stopped in towns along the route for the night. The next morning, convoy segment commanders were ordered to stop the trucks at a rail crossing near Taejon to transfer their passengers to trains for the remainder of the trip to Pusan.

Things soon got worse. An ammunition train blew up in a tunnel near Andong, blocking the rail line to Pusan. Around the same time, a 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry convoy segment was ambushed, wounding 11 men and holding up the rest of the convoy for over two hours. Over the next several days more convoy segments were ambushed, further delaying the division's closure. The segment reached Pusan on October 11. That day, the ROK 3<sup>rd</sup> and Capitol Divisions took Wonsan, North Korea. There was no longer a need for X Corps to make an amphibious landing there. It looked like the 7<sup>th</sup> Division's role in the war might soon end. Rumors spread that the division would be boarding ships to return to Japan. On October 16, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division embarked at Pusan aboard the attack transports *Mason M. Patrick*, *Fred C. Ainsworth*, and *William F. Mitchell* and several LSTs. Aboard ship, they were issued winter parkas and other assorted winter gear. Dreams of an early return to Japan abruptly vanished.

On October 20, the seaward approaches to Wonsan were still heavily mined, making it impossible to get transports or LSTs ashore. Further north, ROK I Corps entered the cities of Hungnam and Hamhung against light resistance. North Korean troops were fleeing without much of a fight while ROK troops pursued them tenaciously, dashing up Korea's northeastern panhandle toward the Chinese and Russian borders. Finally on October 24, after eight agonizing days at anchor, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division received sailing orders. The division would land at the fishing village of Iwon, almost midway up the panhandle between Hungnam and the Russian border.

On October 27, the first snow fell in North Korea and the temperature fell below freezing. The ROK 26<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment, tasked to secure the northern approaches to the Hamhung-Hungnam area, encountered enemy troops as they entered the mountains. They were surprised when the enemy failed to withdraw as they had in every previous engagement in North Korea. Instead, the fight got so intense that the ROKs backed off, but not before taking a dozen or so prisoners. They were members of the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA).

On October 29, a turbulent sea tossed huge waves onto the shore at Iwon, washing away sand ramps used to unload trucks and other heavy cargo. The 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry was already ashore, but the 31<sup>st</sup> would have to stay at sea until November 4 and the 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry could not land until November 9. On October 31, the 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry (less one battalion) and the 49<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery Battalion made a 120 mile motor march along a one-lane dirt road to the inland town of Pungsan to relieve a regiment of the ROK

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relatively few casualties. He retired as a four-star general. Dick Ovenshine was never promoted again, retiring as a colonel.

Capitol Division. Just after 5:00 AM the next morning, they were hit with a mortar barrage, followed closely by a ground attack that reached the artillery positions. The attackers were North Koreans, their determination perhaps bolstered by the presence of tens of thousands of Chinese troops somewhere behind them. The war was about to get a lot tougher.

**Combat Losses 6 September to 4 November 1950  
(3 Officers, 27 Enlisted)**

	<b>6 Sep Yokohama, Japan</b>	
PFC Marion W Justice (Pike, AL)		Accident
	<b>21 Sep Inchon</b>	
PVT Paul H Neilson (Dodge, NE)		Accident
	<b>22 Sep Inchon</b>	
PVT Harold M Baldwin (Goodhue, MN)		DOI 9 Nov
	<b>24 Sep Suwon</b>	
SGT Julius Holbrooks (Atlanta, GA)		KIA
CPL Lloyd R Cabe (Knox, TN)		KIA
CPL Calvin C Vick (Wilson, TN)		KIA
PFC Thomas E Dehm (Oswego, NY)		KIA
PVT Linden Centers (Franklin, OH)		KIA
PVT Carl Dill (Bryan, OK)		KIA
	<b>26 Sep Osan</b>	
1LT William G Fuss (Cincinnati, OH)		KIA
MSG Kenneth J Whalen (Pierce, WI)		KIA
PFC Perry C Norman (Baxter, AR)		KIA
	<b>27 Sep Osan</b>	
1LT Donald C Engh (Del Norte, CA)		KIA
SGT Francis D Thomas (Allegheny, MD)		KIA
CPL Richard L Jones (Creek, OK)		KIA
CPL James T Smith (Warren, TN)		KIA
PFC Earl E Austin (San Bernardino, CA)		DOI 10 Oct
PFC George L Betts (Franklin, OH)		KIA
PFC Raymond Bradley (Philadelphia, PA)		KIA
PFC Melvin Copeland (Chowan, NC)		KIA
PFC Norman L Klaris (Los Angeles, CA)		KIA
PFC Bonifacio Largusa (Honolulu, HI)		KIA
PFC Konrad McKinley (Cattaragus, NY)		KIA
PFC Charles Workman (Summit, OH)		KIA
PVT Charles J Abel, Jr (Muskogee, OK)		KIA
PVT John E Benton (Erie, PA)		KIA
PVT Wilbur R Christy (Butler, PA)		KIA
PVT William Everett (Mobile, AL)		KIA
	<b>28 Sep Osan</b>	
1LT James R Blount (Houston, TX)		DOI 28 Sep
	<b>6 Oct Convoy to Pusan</b>	
PFC Roy M Patten (Hickman, TN)		DOI 6 Oct

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